The long-term effects of political violence on political attitudes : evidence from the Spanish Civil War by Oto-Peralías, Daniel
1The Long-term Effects of Political Violence on Political Attitudes: Evidence
from the Spanish Civil War
Daniel Oto-Peralías*
// Accepted Manuscript: Kyklos, 68(3), 412–442. //
Abstract
This article investigates whether political violence has long-term effects on
attitudes toward political participation. This is an interesting topic because public
engagement and social capital play a crucial role in shaping the economy and
democracy. We exploit a recent survey on the 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War to
shed light on this question. Our findings indicate that being a member of a family
that suffered violence during the Civil War is related to a higher interest,
knowledge and engagement in politics. These results stand in stark contrast to the
common expectation that political violence leads to lower public engagement,
while they are consistent with other studies focusing on the short-term
consequences of civil conflicts. Therefore, the legacy of political violence, far
from creating political apathy, may be the higher involvement of citizens in
politics.
Keywords: Political Violence, Political Attitudes, Social Capital, Spanish Civil War
JEL Classification: D72, D74, D79
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Departamento de Economía, Métodos Cuantitativos e Historia
Económica, Carretera de Utrera, Km. 1, Seville, 41013, Spain. E-mail: dotoper@upo.es.
Acknowledgements: I thank Diego Romero-Ávila, Jesús Crespo-Cuaresma, Carlos Usabiaga and
seminar participants at Pablo de Olavide University for their valuable comments and suggestions.
I am particularly indebted to the editors and referees of this journal for many valuable comments
that have led to a substantial improvement of the original manuscript. The author acknowledges
financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through grant
ECO2012-35430, and the Andalusian Council of Innovation and Science under Excellence Project
SEJ-4546.
2I. INTRODUCTION
The consequences of political violence, particularly of civil wars, are topics that have
attracted considerable interest in recent years (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). According to the
World Bank (2011), one in four people in the world, more than 1.5 billion, live in countries
affected by fragility, conflict, and violence (Balcells and Justino, 2014). Civil conflicts incur
dramatic costs in terms of both human lives and well-being, with the accompanying
destruction of public infrastructure and physical capital (Welsch, 2008; Gates et al., 2012). In
addition to these human and material losses, an interesting finding in the literature is that
political violence may leave significant institutional and political legacies (Blattman and
Miguel, 2010). This article covers a subject that has so far been little studied, namely, the
long-term effects of political violence on attitudes related to political participation. Arguably,
this is a relevant topic because economists and political scientists have long emphasized the
importance of political participation and social capital for the economy and governance (e.g.,
Putnam et al., 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Sabatini, 2008). If political violence had
persistent negative effects on political participation, then a civil war might undermine a
country’s development prospects. Using a recent survey on the political legacy of the Spanish
Civil War, we show that the consequences of this war fought seventy years ago continue to
influence political attitudes today. Interestingly, we find a heartening result: past political
violence is positively related to attitudes toward political participation.
A preliminary analysis at cross-province level provides initial evidence of a positive
relationship between political repression during the Spanish Civil War and electoral turnout
since the re-introduction of democracy in the mid-to-late 1970s. The core of the analysis uses
microdata from a survey conducted in 2008 (CIS, 2008), which contains a representative
sample of almost 3,000 individuals. The regression results indicate a robust positive effect of
political violence on political attitudes. More specifically, reporting direct/indirect political
violence during the Civil War is positively associated with higher interest, knowledge and
engagement in politics.1 We seek to address endogeneity concerns through different
strategies, such as controlling for family political identities during the Civil War, or focusing
on the most randomly distributed types of violence. The results are robust to controlling for
1 ‛Reporting direct/indirect political violence’ means that the respondent suffered political violence during the 
Civil War, or that a relative or someone close was the victim of political violence during the Civil War.
3many individual characteristics, as well as for regional fixed-effects. Interestingly, the effect
of political violence persists when restricting the sample to younger adults (who were born
long after the war), and is not associated with political extremism. Family socialization is a
key factor in the transmission of the effect over time.
This work is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it focuses on the long-term consequences
of political violence and civil wars, while the extant literature has generally studied the short-
term effects. For example, Bellows and Miguel (2009) study the consequences of the 1991–
2002 Sierra Leone Civil War; Blattman (2009) analyzes the ongoing Lord’s Resistance Army
insurgency in Uganda; Beber et al. (2014) base their research on an episode of violence
during a spontaneous riot in 2005 in Sudan, and Gilligan et al. (2014) focus on the 1996-2006
Nepalese Civil War. In contrast to these studies, our data come from a survey conducted in
2008, and referred to a seventy-year-old conflict. Studying the long-term effects of political
violence is pertinent. If the effects continue to be apparent today, it indicates that political
violence is a deep and permanent determinant of political attitudes, and that the legacy of war
can have a long-term influence on the political system.
Secondly, this work also contributes to the vibrant literature on the causes and consequences
of cultural traits, since political attitudes and public engagement are important socio-cultural
aspects.2 This branch of the literature typically focuses on historical events as determinants of
cultural traits. Notably, several papers look back into the past for the roots of social capital
and civic culture. For instance, Guiso et al. (2008) test the hypothesis formulated by Putnam
et al. (1993) whereby the Italian city states that gained independence in the High Middle Ages
developed higher levels of social capital. Alesina and Giuliano (2011) report an inverse
relationship between family ties (a persistent cultural feature of societies) and political
participation. Puntscher et al. (2014) argue that historical shocks may affect social capital
endowment by shaping collective memory. In addition, even such exogenous shocks as
natural disasters have been found to influence social capital (Toya and Skidmore, 2014). Our
paper contributes to this literature by showing that a historical event in the thirties, the
Spanish Civil War, has persistently affected the political attitudes of citizens. This is even
more notable when considering that the war was followed by a period of almost forty years of
dictatorship, and then by a transition to democracy within a context of instability.
2 Reviews of the literature are to be found in Guiso et al. (2006), Nunn (2012), and Alesina and Giuliano (2015).
4Thirdly, this study also addresses the question of whether the lack of interest in politics in
Spain is due to the extreme political violence suffered during the Civil War. Interest in
politics is particularly low in Spain. According to an international survey on citizenship
conducted in 2004, and covering 39 countries as diverse as the United States, Philippines or
Russia (ISSP 2004), Spain records the fourth lowest score in terms of interest in politics, just
ahead of Cyprus, Brazil and Taiwan. Only 31% of respondents are very or fairly interested in
politics. Given Spain’s income per capita, this is a remarkably low figure. According to the
modernization theory (Lipset, 1959), one expects higher economic development to be
reflected in greater interest and engagement in politics. In fact, Spain has the highest negative
residual in a regression of interest in politics on per capita GDP.3 In this regard, an intuitive
explanation for the lack of interest in politics would be the political violence suffered during
the Civil War, which would have left a deep imprint on society. Violence and repression
could be responsible for an attitude of political apathy in society, making people reluctant to
engage in politics. However, our results clearly reject this hypothesis, since growing up in a
family that suffered political violence during the Civil War is positively related to interest in
politics. These apparently counterintuitive results are also found in other papers that focus on
the short-term effects of civil conflicts (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Gilligan
et al., 2014). However, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to provide evidence
of the long-term positive effects on attitudes toward political participation.
There are a couple of interesting articles that use the same survey to study different questions.
Aguilar et al. (2011) analyze the determinants of attitudes toward transitional justice in Spain.
They find that family victimization during the Civil War is not generally associated with
support for such justice, while political repression during the Francoist dictatorship is.
Balcells (2012) focuses on the effect family victimization has on political identities in the left-
right axis, and shows that experiences of victimization during the Civil War and Francoist
dictatorship are related to the rejection of the perpetrators’ political ideology. Unlike these
two papers, we focus on attitudes toward political participation. In addition, we seek to
address the endogeneity issue involved in being a victim of political violence during the war,
and complement the analysis with cross-province evidence of the relationship between
political repression and electoral turnout.
3 Details on the comparative results from the ISSP 2004 survey are available in the Supporting Information
accompanying this paper.
5The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief historical overview
and formulates plausible hypotheses about the effect of political violence on political
attitudes. Section 3 presents some cross-province evidence. Section 4 reports the paper’s main
results using microdata from a survey sample. The next section conducts a sensitivity analysis
and addresses the endogeneity issue. Section 6 provides evidence of possible intervening
variables, while Section 7 considers a wide array of indicators of political attitudes,
knowledge and engagement. Finally, Section 8 puts forward a number of implications and
concludes.
II. THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AND CURRENT POLITICAL ATTITUDES
The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) has weighed heavily upon the history of Spain since the
downfall of the Second Republic.4 The war was the consequence of a failed military coup
against the democratically elected Republican government in July 1936. The coup succeeded
in some provinces but not in others, and as a result, Spain was divided into two zones, one
controlled by the rebels and the other by the Republican government. A fundamental aspect of
the Civil War was its political nature. It was a struggle between two antagonist political
forces: the insurgents or Francoists (called Nationalists), representing the political right,
versus the loyalists or Republicans, representing the left. During the three years the war
lasted, Spain became a scene of extreme political violence. The total number of deaths
exceeded half a million, with around 220,000 being due to political repression. The war also
caused a massive displacement of more than 400,000 people. The victory of the Nationalist
army led to the establishment of a dictatorship that lasted until Franco’s death in 1975 (the
first democratic elections being held in 1977), with political repression continuing for years
after the war. During and after the war, the Francoist regime was committed to purging all
leftist elements in Spain, while the Republicans also committed political violence against
civilians during the war itself, although current estimates clearly indicate that repression on
the Nationalist side was far more widespread than on the Republican side (approximately
200,000 deaths vs. 38,000, according to Beevor, 2006).
While these immediate effects of the war are evident, its long-term consequences on politics,
culture and the economy are still largely unexplored. Given the conflict’s extreme level of
4 The literature on the Spanish Civil War is extensive. Among others, see Juliá et al. (1999), Thomas (2001),
Beevor (2006), and Preston (2006).
6political violence, it stands to reason that it left a deep imprint on political culture and, more
specifically, on attitudes toward political participation.5 With respect to the link between
violent conflicts and political participation, there is some controversy both in the literature
and in the political arena. In the first place, there is a hypothesis that supports the common
expectation that civil war negatively affects public engagement. This is generally the view of
policymakers, journalists, and reintegration experts, who consider that the impacts of a civil
war on individuals engender alienation, violence and even social disintegration (Blattman,
2009). A similar opinion can also be found in a World Bank report stating that a ‛persistent 
adverse legacy [of civil war] is the loss of social capital’ (Collier et al., 2003, p. 21).
According to this hypothesis, we should find a negative relationship between experiencing
violence during the Civil War and attitudes toward political participation. The argument
would be that political violence triggers a rejection of politics. The war itself, as an extreme
manifestation of a political conflict, can be seen as the consequence of too much political
activism. This can create hate, fear or apathy toward politics in general, especially among the
relatives or friends of the war’s victims. In addition, this response to violence may be
intensified if political repression is due to some kind of political activism (e.g., party
membership or labor activism). Therefore, political violence can convey the message that
participation in politics is dangerous, and it is better not to get involved. These attitudes can
be transmitted from one generation to the next through family socialization, and thereby
persist over time. This hypothesis would explain the current lack of interest in politics in
Spain as being a consequence of the Civil War.
Second, a counterintuitive hypothesis would be that political violence increases public
engagement (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Notably, some papers focusing on the short-term
effects of civil conflicts come to the surprising conclusion that being a victim (or witness) of
political violence leads to higher post-war political participation (Bellows and Miguel, 2009;
Blattman, 2009; Gilligan et al., 2014), which is related to psychological research into positive
responses to traumatic events (Masten, 2001). Considering the Spanish case, an explanation
consistent with this hypothesis is that a past episode of political violence suffered by an
individual or their family may mean that politics is more prevalent in the life of the family,
and prompts more political conversations and discussions. Furthermore, victimization may
5 See Balcells (2012) for a study of the effect of victimization during the Civil War and Francoist dictatorship on
ideological identification.
7generate political grievances and resentment, which may lead to political activism. This
second hypothesis implies that the lack of interest in politics in Spain is due to factors other
than the violence suffered during the Civil War.
Finally, it may also be the case that political violence does not have persistent effects on
political attitudes, particularly when applied to Spain (because the war took place more than
seventy years ago). According to this hypothesis, although the Civil War could have short-
term consequences for interest and engagement in politics, its effect has vanished over time,
due –for example– to indoctrination during the dictatorship or to the important changes
introduced by the advent of democracy in the mid-to-late seventies.
III. CROSS-PROVINCE EVIDENCE
This section provides regression evidence on the relationship between political violence and
political participation at provincial level. The dependent variable is the average electoral
turnout for all the parliamentary elections held in Spain since 1977 (from electoral data
provided by the Spanish Government –Ministerio del Interior, 2014). Concerning the
independent variable, we focus on deaths due to Francoist political repression defined as the
ratio of victims to total population (in thousands), since this is the most readily available data
at provincial level. For the sake of completeness, we also report the results using an indicator
of Republican repression.6 Regressions are estimated through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
reporting heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Detailed information about the
definitions and sources of variables used throughout the paper is presented in Appendix I,
while the descriptive statistics are available in the Supporting Information.
Column 1 in Table 1 shows the bivariate relationship between Francoist political repression
and current electoral turnout.7 Interestingly, there is a positive and statistically significant
relationship between both variables across Spanish provinces, which stands against a possible
negative link between political violence and political participation (as predicted by the first
6 We focus here on Francoist repression because it was much more prevalent, and the sample of provinces for
which data are available is larger. A word of caution is in order with respect to these data. The total number of
deaths caused by the Spanish Civil War is a subject of uncertainty and controversy. The same is true for data at
provincial level. We follow Juliá et al. (1999) and Espinosa-Maestre (2008) for data on political repression.
7 The specification includes a dummy variable indicating whether data on Nationalist political repression have
been only partially investigated (which is the case in six provinces). It is important to include this variable in
order to control for the fact that the value of political repression in these provinces may be lower simply because
they have been only partially investigated.
8hypothesis presented above). Column 2 includes four variables that may act as determinants
of political repression; these are, on the one hand, two indicators of the last parliamentary
elections held in the Second Republic (in February 1936): the percentage of votes obtained by
the left-wing coalition (which reflects the predominant ideology just before the Civil War),
and the electoral turnout as a measure of political participation. On the other hand, we include
two variables related to the dynamic of the coup and the war: a dummy variable indicating
whether the military coup succeeded, and the number of days (since the coup) that the
province remained under Republican control. These four indicators may be relevant omitted
variables, biasing the coefficient on political violence in column 1. In this regard, it is
particularly important to control for electoral turnout before the war. Remarkably, the
coefficient on political repression remains positive and statistically significant. The next
column adds two variables related to economic development, namely, per capita income and
the percentage of working age population with secondary or higher education, while column 4
removes those provinces whose data on political repression have been only partially
investigated. The coefficient on Francoist political repression remains robust to these changes
in the specification. Concerning the control variables, the dummy ‛successful coup’, the 
number of days under Republican control, and electoral turnout in 1936 are positively and
significantly related to current turnout. With respect to the repression perpetrated on the
Republican side (columns 5 to 7), the coefficient is positive in the bivariate relationship, but
becomes insignificant when including the control variables.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Conclusions from this cross-province analysis are very tentative due to potential omitted
variable biases and measurement errors. Yet the results are interesting for a couple of reasons.
Firstly, this analysis at provincial level for Spain has not been conducted previously in the
literature, and provides some plausible insights and correlations about the link between
political violence and political behavior. Secondly, the results cast doubt on the intuitive
hypothesis that political violence negatively affects interest and engagement in politics, since
the coefficient on Francoist political repression is positively and significantly related to
electoral turnout.
IV. SURVEY ANALYSIS
1. Data and methodology issues
9The core of our research consists of the analysis of a unique survey conducted in 2008 by the
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS, 2008) that contains information about the
political legacy of the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent Francoist dictatorship. Specific
questions about personal and family experiences related to political violence were posed to a
representative sample of 2,936 individuals aged 18 or older. This survey was possible because
the Socialist Government at the time was promoting restorative actions regarding human
rights violations perpetrated during these two periods, with the survey being designed to
gather information about public opinion on these issues. The survey also contains other
questions about the war period, as well as many items related to current political attitudes.
Our main dependent variable is interest in politics, measured through a dummy variable
indicating whether the individual is very or fairly interested in politics. It is our main indicator
of political attitudes because it is the best way of reflecting whether the individual is
politically apathetic or not. Citizens interested in politics are individuals with positive
attitudes toward the political sphere (including belief in the importance of participating in
politics and of being informed about political affairs), and behaviors congruent with these
convictions. In Section 7 we extend the analysis using alternative indicators of political
attitudes, knowledge and behavior.
Political violence is the main independent variable, which consists of a dummy variable
reflecting whether the respondent, a relative or someone close suffered political violence as a
consequence of the Civil War. In the vast majority of cases, this variable refers to violence
suffered by a relative or someone close (only 53 respondents report personal political
violence, while 1,538 report violence suffered by a relative or someone close), which is
understandable since the Civil War ended seventy years before the survey was conducted.
There is also information about the specific type of violence and the identity of the
perpetrator, which allows us to create several sets of indicators. Firstly, we construct three
variables on the basis of which side in the conflict was responsible for the action: a) political
violence perpetrated by Nationalists or Francoists, b) political violence perpetrated by
Republicans, c) without information on the perpetrators. In a second set, following Balcells
(2012), we differentiate between severe and moderate political violence. Severe political
violence includes killed in action, died in bombing, murdered, condemned to death,
disappeared, forced into exile, and all types of violence suffered by the actual individual.
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Moderate political violence reflects the other types of violence (imprisoned, forced into
hiding, fired from work, and other situations). Finally, we also distinguish between political
violence related to military operations and violence associated with political repression. The
first category includes being killed in action and dying in bombing, while the second category
refers to the remainder.8
A very simple and straightforward way to analyze the effect of political violence on political
attitudes is by comparing respondents reporting direct/indirect political violence with those
not reporting any political violence. In the first group, 38.3% of individuals are interested in
politics, while in the second group only 25.4% are, with the difference being statistically
highly significant (t-stat=7.01). Therefore, respondents reporting political violence are much
more interested in politics, specifically 51% more so (0.383/0.254–1).
However, it is crucial to control for omitted variables that might bias the estimated effect of
political violence. In this regard, the choice of an appropriate set of control variables is not a
trivial task. Some controls that may seem useful to include are actually channels through
which the effect of political violence occurs. An important example is family political
socialization, which can be measured through a question asking how often the respondent was
exposed to conversations on politics at home. This variable clearly acts as a channel, as
political violence during the Civil War could affect family behavior regarding the subject of
politics at home, which in turn may influence current political attitudes.9 Another example is
the respondent’s political identity, which may be affected by political violence in the past, as
shown in Balcells (2012). These two variables are clear instances of ‛bad controls’, that is, 
variables that can themselves be considered outcomes (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, Ch. 3).
With these concerns in mind, we have selected a set of sociodemographic controls that
includes variables generally found in the political behavior literature, such as a person’s age,
gender, attitude to religion, size of municipality in terms of population, and level of education.
A set of dummy variables indicating the region (Autonomous Community) in which the
respondent resides is also included. It is important to take this factor into account because
8 The Supporting Information provides a frequency table for these different classifications of political violence.
9 In this regard, since people that directly experienced the Civil War are a tiny minority (only approximately 13%
of the respondents were born before the outbreak of the war), the transmission of political attitudes and values
from one generation to the next plays a central role in the observed results. Therefore, intervening factors in this
process are not appropriate controls.
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political decentralization is high in Spain, and the quality and performance of regional
governments can affect citizens’ political attitudes.10 In addition, to address the endogeneity
issue whereby families more involved in politics at the outbreak of the Civil War could have
suffered more political violence, we always control for two variables indicating whether the
respondent’s family had political sympathy with one or other of the warring sides
(Nationalists or Republicans), which may capture their level of political activism.
2. Initial regression evidence
The equation to be estimated is as follows:
Int_Pol i,r= α + β1*Pol_Violence i,r + β2*Sociodem i,r + β3*Region r + β4*Nationalist i,r +
β5*Republicans i,r + εi,r
where Int_Poli,r means the current interest in politics of individual i in region r;
Pol_Violencei,r stands for our main indicator of political violence; Sociodemi,r represents the
set of sociodemographic controls; Regionr is a set of dummy variables indicating the
Autonomous Community where the respondent lives; Nationalisti,r indicates whether the
respondent’s family sympathized with the Nationalists during the Civil War, Republicansi,r
means the same, but referred to the Republicans, and εi,r is the error term. Since the dependent
variable is a binary indicator, we use a logistic regression model with heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors reporting odds ratios.11
Table 2 reports the paper’s main results. Column 1 shows the bivariate relationship between
political violence and current interest in politics. The coefficient indicates that individuals
reporting direct/indirect political violence during the Civil War have 82% greater odds of
being interested in politics (i.e., the probability of being interested in politics relative to the
probability of not being interested) than those not reporting political violence.12 Column 2
10 The quality of government institutions influences political attitudes, as shown, for example, in Rohrschneider
(2005) and Anderson and Tverdova (2003).
11 We prefer to report odds ratios in the main text because they are more informative than the logistic
coefficients. For the sake of completeness, the Supporting Information also provides all the results with the
logistic coefficients and their standard errors.
12 In the previous section we indicate that 38.3% of respondents reporting political violence are interested in
politics. Consequently, the probability of being interested in politics (p) for this group is 0.383, and the
probability of not being interested in politics (1-p) is 0.617. For those not reporting political violence p equals
0.254 and 1-p equals 0.746. Therefore, the odds ratio is 1.82, that is, (0.383/0.617)/(0.254/0.746). A coefficient
(odds ratio) higher than 1 indicates an increase in the odds of being interested in politics.
12
adds the set of sociodemographic controls. Interest in politics increases with age, municipality
size and education, and is lower for women. The next column includes 17 regional dummies,
which jointly appear highly significant.13 Column 4 reports the results from our baseline
specification that also includes Nationalists and Republicans. The two new variables
significantly increase the probability of being interested in politics, but without affecting the
coefficient on political violence, which remains highly significant.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The next three columns compare the different types of political violence. Column 5 divides
political violence by the identity of the perpetrator (Nationalists, Republicans, and unknown).
Interestingly, the effect of political violence is the same when the perpetrators are
Republicans or Nationalists (we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients).
The effect is not statistically significant when the perpetrators are unknown. This last result
suggests that for political violence to have an impact on political attitudes, it is important for
information about the traumatic episode to be transmitted within the family. Column 6
distinguishes between severe and moderate political violence, with the effect in both cases
being very similar and statistically equal. Finally, column 7 divides political violence into two
categories, depending on whether violence is related to military operations or to political
repression. The coefficient on violence associated with military operations is slightly higher,
but again, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients.
V. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND THE ENDOGENEITY ISSUE
1. Robustness to additional control variables
Table 3 addresses two concerns about our initial findings. Firstly, the results may be partially
due to political repression during Francoism. In this regard, it is important to note that this
factor may in fact be considered an intermediate variable. Thus, political violence during the
Civil War could affect political attitudes, which could in turn increase the chances of being a
victim of political repression during the dictatorship. With this in mind, column 1 controls for
an indicator measuring whether the respondent, a relative or someone close suffered political
repression during the Francoist dictatorship. The coefficient on repression during Francoism
is significantly higher than one, which indicates a greater probability of being interested in
13 The p-value of the joint significance test is 0.0006.
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politics, while the coefficient on political violence during the Civil War continues to be
statistically highly significant.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Secondly, the other concern addressed in Table 3 is that political violence suffered within the
family may not be the only major type of violence to be considered. Political violence
observed in the local environment (or, in other words, witnessing violence in others) may also
matter. Indeed, we can hypothesize opposite effects in both cases. Political violence suffered
by the respondent or their family may have positive effects on their interest in politics (as we
have observed so far), but political violence in the local environment may diminish the
interest in politics.14 Column 2 includes the percentage of individuals reporting political
violence in the province in which the respondent resides, as a proxy for political violence
experienced in the local context. The effect of our main indicator remains fairly similar in size
and statistical significance, while the new variable also appears to raise interest in politics. In
columns 3 and 4 we calculate analogous variables, albeit referred to the province in which the
respondent spent their childhood and adolescence, and to the province in which their parental
family lived during the war, respectively. These two variables are statistically insignificant.
Column 5 further investigates this question by excluding those observations that report
political violence. We then specifically analyze the effect of violence observed in the local
environment among those that have not experienced political violence (personally or through
their families). Interestingly, the effect of this measure of political violence is now statistically
insignificant; with the result being the same using the indicators employed in columns 3 and
4.15
2. Endogeneity concerns
Table 4 addresses two different endogeneity problems. The first one is related to the
subjective nature of our political violence indicator: it refers to what people know or
remember. Since individuals interested in politics may be more likely to remember political
14 A past episode of violence can allow politics to feature more in the life of the family, make conversations on
politics more frequent, and generate political grievances and resentment, which may lead to political activism. In
contrast, families that did not experience violence are not affected by these mechanisms. Instead, witnessing
violence in others can create fear and apathy, and the message that it is better not to get involved in politics.
15 Bellows and Miguel (2009) also provide evidence to show that violence affecting the individual’s household is
much more relevant than witnessing violence in others.
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violence or be more prone to search for information regarding family experiences during the
war, the fact of reporting violence in the survey could be endogenous to interest in politics.
Although this is a plausible argument, the Civil War was a major historical event that had a
profound impact on Spanish families. In some cases, this violent episode was experienced by
the respondents themselves, and in the majority of cases by the respondents’ parents or
grandparents. Therefore, information about violence suffered by the family during the war is
quite accessible to everybody (whether or not they are interested in politics), with no need to
consciously search for information. In addition, we apply three tests to deal with this issue.
Column 1 in Table 4 restricts the sample to older people (aged over 65) under the assumption
that they have better information about the past (the war affected them much more directly),
and so the potential ‛information bias’ is lower. Column 2 follows a similar strategy by 
focusing on respondents that personally suffered political violence during the Civil War. Only
individuals aged over 65 were asked whether they personally suffered violence, whereby the
sample is trimmed accordingly. This is an interesting test because data on personal
victimization are arguably much less affected by the ‛information bias’. The odds ratios for 
political violence in both columns are statistically significant and much higher than 1, thereby
supporting our previous findings.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Alternatively, we may argue that severe political violence (e.g., killed in action, murdered, or
condemned to death) is more difficult to forget than moderate violence, and that it is easier to
be informed about it. Therefore, the ‛information bias’ can be lower in this case. Column 3 
removes observations reporting moderate political violence in order to focus on its severe
form, whose coefficient appears statistically highly significant, being very similar to that of
the baseline specification. Column 4 applies a different strategy. In this case, we directly
control for an indicator measuring the level of information and knowledge of the respondent
about the Civil War period. This indicator is estimated as the first principal component of six
variables indicating whether the respondent correctly answered several questions about the
Civil War (i.e., with an answer other than ‛does not know’/‛does not answer’).16 The
16 Four of these questions are related to the respondent’s family situation and experiences during the war period,
while the other two refer to the general level of knowledge about the Civil War. Since these are binary variables,
we perform the principal component analysis on the polychoric correlation matrix (Kolenikov and Angeles,
2004).
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reasoning is as follows: if interest in politics (potentially) leads to a deeper search for
information about the war period, we can mitigate this bias by controlling for an indicator
measuring the level of knowledge about the war. However, to the extent that being informed
about the war may also be the consequence of having a loved one that suffered violence, the
inclusion of this indicator may bias the true value of the coefficient on political violence
toward zero. Therefore, this is a conservative estimation of the effect of violence on interest in
politics. Remarkably, the coefficient on political violence remains statistically significant,
although somewhat lower in magnitude, while the new control variable significantly increases
the odds of being interested in politics. To recapitulate, the evidence obtained so far in this
section suggests that a bias caused by the subjective nature of our indicator is not driving our
results.
The second endogeneity problem addressed in Table 4 refers to the omitted variable bias; that
is, the existence of other factors affecting both political violence and current political
attitudes. In particular, we are concerned with the possibility that families that were politically
active before the Civil War could have suffered more political violence as a consequence of
their political activism. This, coupled with the fact that political attitudes are transmitted
through family socialization, implies that the observed relationship between political violence
and current interest in politics may be driven by the family tradition in political attitudes. In
other words, what we are observing could be the perpetuation over time of political attitudes
within the family.
We address this issue by employing several strategies. In essence, they have to do with
controlling for pre-war family political attitudes and focusing on the most exogenous types of
political violence. Firstly, the previous regressions have controlled for the variables
Republicans and Nationalists, which measure whether the respondent’s family sympathized
with one or other of the two warring sides. To the extent that these variables of family
political identity are related to pre-war political attitudes (e.g., interest in politics), they serve
as good controls that allow us to better identify the effect of political violence. Arguably, it is
very unlikely that families with no interest at all in politics at the outbreak of the Civil War
sympathized with either Nationalists or Republicans. Therefore, by considering this initial
political affinity, we partially control for pre-war political attitudes within the family.
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Secondly, we can further mitigate the omitted variable bias by controlling for additional
variables capturing the political attitudes of the respondent’s family before the outbreak of the
war. The survey contains a couple of questions about the parents’ political identity in terms of
the relevant cleavage during the war, namely, the left–right cleavage. If we restrict the sample
to elderly respondents (aged 70 or over), we can create an indicator of family political identity
before the war (i.e., the parents’ ideology),17 and in this way control for a proxy for pre-war
political attitudes (to the extent that political attitudes are related to political identities).18
Another advantage of using a subsample of respondents over the age of 69 is that, as noted
above, we reduce the measurement error in the variables referring to the war period, since
elderly people tend to have more direct and better information than young people in this
regard.
Column 5 includes the father’s political identity, measured by an indicator that takes values
from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Column 6 adds the mother’s political identity,
measured in the same way. The next two columns operationalize political identity in a
different way. A linear relationship of political identity in the left-right axis with political
violence or political attitudes is probably not satisfactory. Instead, we expect a U-shaped
relationship between political identity and our variables of interest; political violence and
interest in politics tend to be greater at the extremes of the ideological spectrum. We thus
create a new variable, political extremism, taking values from 0 (positions 5 and 6 on the
ideological scale) to 4 (positions 1 and 10 on the scale). Column 7 controls for the father’s
political extremism, and column 8 adds the mother’s political extremism. It is remarkable that
the coefficient on political violence remains fairly robust to these additions, while the new
controls never appear with statistically significant coefficients.
Columns 9 to 11 use an alternative strategy to deal with this endogeneity issue by focusing on
the most exogenous types of political violence (with respect to pre-war political attitudes).
Some types of political violence are probably more closely associated with pre-war political
17 Individuals aged 70 in 2008 (year of the survey) were born in 1938. Assuming that on average the parents of
these respondents were 30 years old when these were born, then at the outbreak of the Civil War they were 28
years old (the average age of childbirth is generally considered to be 30 –usually referred to as ‛generational 
duration’–, with this age remaining relatively stable over time [Piketty, 2014, Ch. 11]). If we assume that
political identity is already shaped by the age of 28 (which is a reasonable assumption –see Rubin et al., 1998,
and references therein), we can thus create an indicator of the pre-war parents’ ideology.
18 Using current data, there is indeed a strong link between interest in politics and an indicator of political
identity such as political extremism (see the definition of this variable below).
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activism than others. This is the case of the categories previously labeled as political
repression (e.g., murdered, condemned to death or imprisoned ‒see Section 4.1), which were
probably more concentrated on political party members and people publicly identified with
one of the political factions. In contrast, the categories related to military operations, that is,
killed in action and died in bombing, are more randomly distributed. As argued in Balcells
(2012), there is some randomness in the initial areas under the control of each faction, and
both armies enforced military conscription. Thus, certain exogeneity exists regarding who
fought in the war. Column 9 compares the effect of violence due to military operations with
that of no political violence at all; that is, the sample excludes individuals reporting political
repression. It is reassuring that the coefficient on political violence remains largely similar to
that of our baseline specification, which is totally consistent with the result shown in Table 2
(column 7), where we indicate that the coefficients on violence due to repression and military
operations are statistically equal.
Column 10 focuses on bombing, which is by nature the most randomly distributed type of
violence. In this specification, the treatment group is composed of those individuals reporting
that a relative or someone close died in a bombing, and the comparison group consists of
respondents not reporting violence. A drawback of this approach is the small number of
observations that report bombing (only 64), but it is still pertinent to check whether the effect
on the interest in politics remains. Remarkably, the odds of being interested in politics are
about 73% higher for those reporting bombing than for those not reporting violence, with the
difference being statistically significant.
A similar strategy is conducted in column 11. It has been argued that political violence
perpetrated by the Nationalists was more systematic than that perpetrated by the Republicans.
Herreros and Criado (2009) argue that in the territory under their control, the Nationalists
concentrated violence on individuals that could have acted as political leaders in any
opposition to Francoist rule. Consequently, leftist and Republican political activists were
more severely persecuted. In contrast, according to these authors, political violence conducted
in the Republican zone did not follow this logic, but instead was due to the collapse of the
state, and had a more indiscriminate character. This implies that Republican violence was
more randomly distributed than Nationalist repression and, therefore, constitutes a more
exogenous variable of political violence. Accordingly, column 11 focuses on respondents
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reporting violence perpetrated by the Republicans, and shows that the effect is very similar to
that observed in the baseline specification. Indeed, column 5 in Table 2 shows that the
coefficients on Nationalist and Republican political violence are statistically equal. All this
evidence suggests that systematic selection into victimization is not driving the results.19
To sum up, the political violence suffered by the respondents or their families during the Civil
War appears to exert an important impact on current political attitudes. Using the whole
sample, the odds of being interested in politics are at least 50% higher for individuals
reporting political violence. Using subsamples of older people, the odds are more than 100%
higher. The results are robust to controlling for a wide array of factors and to several
endogeneity tests. The consistency recorded by the coefficient on political violence suggests
that the findings are not an artifact due to a problem of endogeneity.
VI. SOME EVIDENCE ABOUT THE MECHANISMS
Thus far we have shown that political violence has a long-term positive effect on interest in
politics. We hold the view that two mechanisms are at work. Firstly, political violence affects
political attitudes and behaviors, for example, through grievances and resentment or by
making politics more present in the life of the family. All these factors can increase interest in
politics.20 Secondly, political attitudes are transmitted within the family from one generation
to the next. Table 5 provides some evidence consistent with these hypotheses.
We begin with the second point. The persistence of the effect over time indicates that family
socialization is a key mechanism. It is striking that an event that happened seventy years ago
19 The effect of political violence also remains after excluding from the sample respondents whose families had
affinity with one of the two sides in the war (in this way, we exclude individuals from politically active families).
Moreover, the results are robust when simultaneously addressing the two endogeneity problems indicated above.
In this sense, we have conducted the following tests: 1) to control at the same time for the father’s extremism and
the level of knowledge about the war, 2) to focus on the most exogenous types of violence, and to either control
for our indicator of knowledge about the war or restrict the sample to respondents older than 65. These results
are available in the Supporting Information.
20 This argument and our results in general are related to psychology research that finds evidence of positive
responses to trauma. Children victims of violence or other traumas are in general resilient, with results
suggesting that resilience usually emerges from the normative functions of human adaptational systems (Masten,
2001). Findings of ‛post-traumatic growth’ experiences (i.e., positive changes occurring as a consequence of a 
struggle with a severe life crisis) prevail over those of psychiatric disorders (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004). For
example, Carmil and Breznitz (1991) find that Holocaust survivors and children of survivors have less extreme
political preferences, greater belief in God, and are more optimistic about the future, while Punamäki et al.
(1997) find a positive correlation between traumatic events and children’s political activity. More recently,
Annan et al. (2011) argue that although war and violence generate social and psychological problems,
particularly in females, the majority of ex-combatants are resilient and able to reintegrate socially.
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continues to shape political attitudes today, even among people that had not yet been born. To
make it absolutely clear that political violence during the war affects people that did not
experience it, the first two columns in Table 5 divide the sample by the median age of 45. The
coefficient on political violence for respondents under the age of 45 (column 2) –who were
born well after the war– is very similar to the coefficient for those aged 45 or over (column
1); indeed, it is slightly greater. Column 3 shows that the effect of political violence remains
unchanged even when restricting the sample to the young (up to the age of 30).
A more direct way to analyze the role of family socialization is conducted in columns 4 and 5,
where the dependent variables are whether the respondent’s family used to talk about the
Civil War during his or her childhood and adolescence, and whether the respondent was often
exposed to conversations on politics at home, respectively. Interestingly, our indicator of
political violence significantly increases the probability of family conversations about the war
and political conversations at home. In the first case, the odds ratio is higher, which suggests
that political violence specifically increases the frequency of conversations about the war and,
generally, conversations about politics at home.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Regarding the first mechanism mentioned above, column 6 analyzes whether political
violence is related to a feeling of rage when thinking about the Civil War. According to our
argument, political violence leads to rage or resentment, and then to political activism. This is
exactly what we observe: the coefficient on political violence is higher than 1 and statistically
significant. Column 7 uses the dependent variable of whether thinking about the war produces
a feeling of fear. This exercise is a falsification test, since we do not expect political violence
to be associated with such a feeling. Indeed, the feeling of fear is related to the common
expectation of a negative effect of civil conflicts on public engagement, in the sense that
political violence leads to fear, and fear leads to political apathy. As predicted by our
argument, the coefficient on political violence is statistically insignificant in this case.
The last column tests whether political violence has an effect on a respondent’s political
extremism (measured in the same way as ‛father’s extremism’). Although we do not make 
specific predictions about this question, this is an interesting issue to analyze. We find that
past political violence is not related to current political extremism, which suggests that it does
not work as an intervening variable. This result is encouraging from the point of view of
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conflict resolution, which is in line with the findings reported by Blattman (2009) on the very
different context of Uganda, where violence led to peaceful and productive participation.21
VII. OTHER INDICATORS OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES
Table 6 reports the results from our baseline specification for other indicators of political
attitudes, knowledge and engagement. We begin with an indicator that reflects the
respondent’s view about the role of politics in society, in particular, whether politics only
creates conflicts and divisions. Such a negative view about politics is clearly related to
political apathy. Secondly, column 2 uses an indicator measuring whether the respondent
considers that it is very important to be informed about politics. Next, we introduce three
variables related to the individual’s channels for obtaining political information (columns 3-
5). They stand for how often the respondent reads the political sections in newspapers, listens
to or watches the news, and uses the Internet to obtain political information, respectively, with
values ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (daily). The three previous indicators are complemented by
an indicator on actual political knowledge (column 6). It is created by combining the answers
to three questions about Spanish political issues. The scale of this indicator ranges from 0 (all
wrong answers) to 3 (all correct answers).
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The next set of variables involves the attitudes and behaviors related to political participation.
Column 7 introduces an indicator reflecting political apathy: ‛it is better not to get involved in 
politics’; while column 8 uses a variable that indicates a favorable opinion about political
participation: whether the respondent agrees with the statement whereby for democracy to
work well, citizens must participate in politics. Columns 9 and 10 employ two variables
measuring whether the respondent has in the last year or ever taken part in any one of the
following actions: writing to the press to complain, contacting public officials, participating in
a strike or demonstration, or signing a petition. Finally, column 11 uses a variable indicating
whether the individual voted in the last parliamentary elections. Specifications using
dichotomous dependent variables are estimated with a logistic regression model, while
equations that use non-dichotomous variables are estimated via OLS.
21 The indicators Civil War conversations, Political conversations, Thinking about the Civil War: Rage and
Political extremism are positively and significantly related to interest in politics. The odds ratios are particularly
high for the first two variables. Thinking about the Civil War: Fear has a negative impact on interest in politics.
These unreported results are available in the Supporting Information.
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The results are fully consistent with our previous findings. On the one hand, political violence
reduces the probability of considering that politics only creates conflicts, and of thinking that
‛it is better not to get involved in politics’. On the other hand, political violence increases the 
frequency of using the mass media and the Internet to obtain political information, real
political knowledge, the likelihood of thinking that political participation is important for
democracy, and real engagement in politics (except in the case of voting).22 Therefore, the
long-term consequences of political violence, far from creating political apathy, are a higher
level of interest in politics, more public involvement, and a more favorable view of the
political process.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows that the Spanish Civil War continues to influence the political attitudes of
citizens today. Preliminary cross-province evidence suggests that political repression
perpetrated during the war is positively correlated with current electoral turnout. A more
comprehensive analysis using survey data indicates a positive effect of political violence on
interest in politics, as well as on other indicators of political attitudes, knowledge and
engagement. The effect of political violence appears remarkably robust, remaining after
controlling for many individual characteristics, regional fixed-effects, and variables referred
to the war period. The analysis also addresses two endogeneity problems: one related to the
fact that those individuals with a greater interest in politics may have better information about
the past and report more violence; and the other related to the possibility that politically active
families could have suffered more violence during the war. A battery of tests suggests that
endogeneity is not driving the results, although we are aware that it is impossible to
completely rule out a potential endogeneity bias.
A long-term positive effect of political violence on political participation is a heartening
result, particularly considering that Spain experienced a long dictatorship after the war. Our
results are consistent with the findings of other papers that analyze the short-term effects of
political violence on political participation in developing countries (Bellows and Miguel,
2009, Blattman, 2009, Gilligan et al., 2014). We argue that family socialization plays a
central role in transmitting the effect of political violence. In this regard, individuals from
22 The odds ratio for voting is higher than 1, but statistically insignificant. The reason may be the low variability
in the answers to this question (only 15% of respondents indicate abstention).
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families that suffered political violence were more exposed to conversations on politics at
home during their childhood and adolescence. In addition, our results suggest that the current
lack of interest in politics in Spain does not have its roots in the extreme political violence
experienced by Spanish society during the Civil War. Contrary to expectations, the war
appears to have left a positive legacy on attitudes toward political participation.
This article is also related to the literature on the historical determinants of culture. Our
analysis indicates that a historical event that occurred seventy years ago is an important
determinant of attitudes towards political participation, and therefore of social capital. Given
the importance attributed to social capital for the proper functioning of the economy and
democracy (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Putnam et al., 1993), it is an encouraging result
that political violence does not necessarily undermine it.
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TABLES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Francoist political repression 0.313* 0.42** 0.389** 0.424**
(0.166) (0.178) (0.178) (0.182)




Left vote (%) in 1936 -0.067 -0.069 -0.087 -0.009 -0.016
(0.064) (0.066) (0.077) (0.072) (0.07)
Electoral turnout (%) in 1936 0.366*** 0.372*** 0.366*** 0.373** 0.373**
(0.118) (0.121) (0.124) (0.16) (0.157)
Successful coup 3.945* 3.895* 4.478* 2.354 2.449
(2.087) (2.043) (2.438) (2.492) (2.322)
Days under Republican control 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.01*** 0.005 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Per capita GDP in 1981 -6.23 -6.92 -10.178*
(4.571) (4.851) (5.195)
Education in 1980 0.049 0.058 0.214
(0.18) (0.217) (0.198)
R 2 0.11 0.51 0.53 0.50 0.08 0.35 0.43
Number of observations 48 46 46 40 36 34 34
Dummy- Francoist political
repression partially investigated
Dependent variable is Electoral turnout (1977-2011)
Notes: Variables descriptions are provided in Appendix I. All regressions are estimated by OLS. The estimations
include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **
and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Table 1
Political violence and political participation: Cross-province evidence
27
1 2 3 4 5 6 7








1.007** 1.007** 1.006* 1.005* 1.006* 1.006**
0.465*** 0.462*** 0.468*** 0.473*** 0.468*** 0.468***
1.023 1.015 1.023 1.025 1.023 1.023
1.003*** 1.003** 1.003** 1.003** 1.003** 1.003**
2.298*** 2.363*** 2.345*** 2.306*** 2.346*** 2.349***
4.844*** 4.983*** 4.966*** 4.786*** 4.965*** 4.967***
1.775*** 1.681*** 1.775*** 1.767***
1.898*** 1.699*** 1.898*** 1.901***
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R 2 0.01 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12
Number of observations 2,634 2,577 2,577 2,532 2,531 2,532 2,532
Violence related to military operations
Table 2
Political violence and political attitudes: Survey evidence (logistic regressions reporting odds ratios)
Dependent variable is Interest in politics
Notes: Variables descriptions are provided in Appendix I. All regressions are estimated by a logistic regression model reporting
odds ratios. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations. *, ** and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Significance levels are estimated using robust standard errors.
Political violence
Pol. violence perpetrated by Nationalists
Pol. violence perpetrated by Republicans
Pol. violence: unknown perpetrators
Severe political violence
Moderate political violence
Violence related to political repression
Family affinity with Nationalists











1 2 3 4 5
1.447*** 1.465*** 1.504*** 1.508***
1.005 1.006* 1.006* 1.006* 1.009*
0.47*** 0.468*** 0.467*** 0.467*** 0.455***
1.021 1.023 1.023 1.023 0.998
1.003** 1.003*** 1.003** 1.003** 1.002
2.28*** 2.325*** 2.345*** 2.342*** 2.148***
4.931*** 4.943*** 4.97*** 4.962*** 4.103***
1.853*** 1.79*** 1.775*** 1.777*** 1.963***





Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R 2 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11
Number of observations 2,336 2,532 2,532 2,532 1,322
Table 3
Political violence and political attitudes: Robustness to additional controls (logistic regressions reporting odds ratios)
Size of municipality





Notes: Variables descriptions are provided in Appendix I. All regressions are estimated by a logistic regression model reporting odds
ratios. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5
and 1% level, respectively. Significance levels are estimated using robust standard errors.
Average political violence: current province
Average political violence: childhood province
Average political violence: Civil War province
Secondary education
Higher education
Family affinity with Nationalists



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(≥ 45 years) (< 45 years) (≤ 30 years)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1.459** 1.532*** 1.55* 2.275*** 1.823*** 1.177* 1.04 0.936
0.98*** 1.01 0.962 1.019*** 0.983*** 1.007** 1.001 1.002
0.444*** 0.464*** 0.537*** 1.245** 0.913 1.074 1.431*** 0.976
1.004 1.055** 1.012 0.996 1.01 0.96*** 1.025 0.89***
1.004** 1.003 1.002 1.00 1.004*** 0.998* 0.999 1.001
2.068*** 2.624*** 2.243*** 1.22 1.464*** 1.059 0.841 1.01
4.839*** 5.668*** 5.801*** 1.598*** 2.567*** 1.05 0.683** 1.002
2.309*** 1.322 0.777 1.617*** 1.676*** 0.82 0.862 1.522***
1.986*** 1.753*** 1.661** 1.954*** 2.186*** 1.437*** 1.013 2.688***
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R 2 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.08
Number of observations 1,245 1,287 534 2,470 2,479 2,533 2,520 2,146
Table 5





Notes: Variables descriptions are provided in Appendix I. All regressions are estimated by a logistic regression model reporting odds
ratios. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average electoral turnout (actual voters/electoral census) of all the parliamentary elections held




The ratio of deaths due to Francoist/Republican political repression to total population in 1930,
in thousands (Juliá et al., 1999; Espinosa-Maestre, 2008; 1930 Population Census, Instituto




Dummy variable indicating whether the province has been only partially investigated with
respect to data on Francoist political repression. There are six provinces only partially
investigated (Juliá et al., 1999; Espinosa-Maestre, 2008).
Left vote (%) in 1936 Percentage of votes obtained by the left-wing coalition in the last parliamentary elections held in
the Second Republic, in February 1936 (Linz and De Miguel, 1977).
Electoral turnout (%) in
1936
Electoral turnout in the last parliamentary elections held in the Second Republic, in February
1936 (Linz and De Miguel, 1977).
Successful coup Dummy variable indicating whether the military coup succeeded in the capital city of the
province. For the case of Asturias, we consider whether the military coup succeeded in Gijón,
the most populated city (García de Cortázar, 2005).
Days under Republican
control
Number of days (since the coup) that the province remained under Republican control (Abella,
1976).
Per capita GDP in 1981 GDP per capita in 1981 (Carreras et al., 2005).
Education in 1980 Percentage of individuals with secondary or higher education over the total working age
population ‒aged 16 or older (Human capital data, IVIE, 2012).
Survey data:1
Main dependent variable
Interest in politics Dummy variable indicating whether the individual is very or fairly interested in politics.
Political violence variables
Political violence This is the main indicator of political violence: dummy variable reflecting whether the
respondent, a relative or someone close suffered political violence during the Civil War. With
respect to violence suffered by a relative or someone close, the survey asks for up to three
people. We only focus on the first person. This also applies to the following indicators of
political violence.
Pol. violence perpetrated by
Nationalists, Republicans or
unknown perpetrators
Three dummy variables indicating whether the respondent, a relative or someone close suffered
political violence during the Civil War perpetrated by Nationalists (Francoists), Republicans, or
the perpetrators are unknown (the respondent answers DK/NA).
Severe political violence,
Moderate political violence
Two dummy variables reflecting whether a relative or someone close suffered severe political
violence during the Civil War (killed in action, died in bombing, murdered, condemned to death,
disappeared, forced into exile) or moderate political violence (imprisoned, forced into hiding,
fired from work, and other situations). Political violence suffered by the actual respondent is




Violence related to military
operations or political
repression
Two dummy variables indicating whether a relative or someone close suffered political violence
during the Civil War that can be associated with military operations (killed in action or died in
bombing) or with political repression (the other categories).
A relative died in a bombing Dummy variable reflecting whether a relative or someone close died as a consequence of a
bombing raid during the Civil War.
Direct political violence Dummy variable reflecting whether the actual respondent suffered political violence during the
Civil War.
Basic control variables
Age Age of the respondent.
Woman Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a woman.
Religiosity Importance of religion for the individual, measured on a scale from 0 (minimal importance) to 10
(maximum importance).
Size of municipality Population (in 10,000 inhabitants) of the town in which the respondent resides.
Secondary education, Higher
education




Two dummy variables reflecting whether the respondent’s family had political sympathy with
the Nationalists (Francoist) or loyalists (Republican) during the Civil War.




Binary indicator measuring whether the respondent, a relative or someone close suffered political





Three variables indicating the percentage of individuals reporting political violence during the
Civil War (i.e., the average of the variable ‛Political violence’), calculated: i) for the provinces
where the respondents reside, ii) for the provinces where the respondents spent their childhood
and adolescence, iii) for the provinces where the respondents’ parental family lived during the
Civil War.
Level of knowledge about
the war
The first principal component of six dummy variables indicating whether the respondent
answered differently to ‛does not know’/‛does not answer’ to the following questions related to
the Civil War: 1) whether the family had political sympathy with one or other of the two sides, 2)
the province of residence of the paternal family, 3) the size of the municipality of the paternal
family, 4) whether a relative or someone close suffered violence, 5) which side caused more
deaths, and 6) who was mainly responsible for the outbreak of the war. Since these are binary
variables, we perform the principal component analysis on the polychoric correlation matrix.
Father’s ideology, Mother’s
ideology
Two variables indicating the political identity of the respondent’s father and mother, measured
by an indicator that takes values from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).
Father’s extremism,
Mother’s extremism
Two indicators measuring the political extremism of the respondent’s father and mother, with
values ranging from 0 (positions 5 and 6 on the ideological scale) to 4 (positions 1 and 10 on the
scale).




Civil War conversations Binary indicator measuring whether the respondent’s family used to talk about the Civil War
during the respondent’s childhood and adolescence.
Political conversations Binary indicator measuring whether the respondent was often exposed to political conversations
at home during the respondent’s childhood and adolescence.
Thinking about the Civil
War: Rage/ Fear
Two dummy variables reflecting whether thinking about the Civil War makes the respondent
feel (in first or second place) rage or fear.
Political extremism Indicator of the respondent’s political extremism, taking values from 0 (positions 5 and 6 on the
ideological scale) to 4 (positions 1 and 10 on the scale).
Other indicators of political attitudes and behavior
Agreeing with: Politics only
creates conflicts
Binary indicator that reflects whether the respondent agrees with the statement that politics only
creates conflicts and divisions.
Agreeing with: it is
important to be politically
informed
Binary indicator that reflects whether the respondent agrees with the statement that it is very
important to be informed about politics.
Reading the political section
in newspapers
Variable measuring how often the respondent reads the political sections in newspapers, with
values ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (daily).
Listening/watching the news Variable measuring how often the respondent listens to or watches the news, with values ranging
from 0 (never) to 4 (daily).
Obtaining political
information via the Internet
Variable measuring how often the respondent uses the Internet to obtain political information,
with values ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (daily).
Level of knowledge about
politics
Indicator about political knowledge created by combining the answers to three questions asking
about Spanish political issues. The scale of this indicator ranges from 0 (all wrong answers) to 3
(three correct answers).
Agreeing with: it is better
not to get involved in
politics
Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent agrees with the statement that it is better not




Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent agrees with the statement that for democracy
to work well, citizens must participate in politics.
Actual participation: last
year
Dummy variable measuring whether in the last year the respondent has taken part in any one of
the following actions: writing to the press to complain, contacting public officials, participating
in a strike or demonstration, or signing a petition.
Actual participation: once Dummy variable measuring whether the respondent has taken part at least once in any one of the
following actions: writing to the press to complain, contacting public officials, participating in a
strike or demonstration, or signing a petition.
Voted in the last elections Dummy variable indicating whether the individual voted in the last parliamentary elections held
in March 2008.
Notes:
1. The source is “Estudio: 2760. Memorias de la Guerra Civil y el Franquismo.” Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas,
Madrid. Available at http://www.cis.es/.
Description of variables (Continued)
